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Abstract: The new characteristics of Wireless Multimedia Sensor Network (WMSN)
and its design issues brought by handling different trafﬁc classes of multimedia content
(video streams, audio, and still images) as well as scalar data over the network, make the
proposed routing protocols for typical WSNs not directly applicable for WMSNs. Handling
real-time multimedia data requires both energy efﬁciency and QoS assurance in order to
ensure efﬁcient utility of different capabilities of sensor resources and correct delivery of
collected information. In this paper, we propose a Secure Cluster-based Multipath Routing
protocol for WMSNs, SCMR, to satisfy the requirements of delivering different data types
and support high data rate multimedia trafﬁc. SCMR exploits the hierarchical structure of
powerful cluster heads and the optimized multiple paths to support timeliness and reliable
high data rate multimedia communication with minimum energy dissipation. Also, we
present a light-weight distributed security mechanism of key management in order to secure
the communication between sensor nodes and protect the network against different types
of attacks. Performance evaluation from simulation results demonstrates a signiﬁcant
performance improvement comparing with existing protocols (which do not even provide
any kind of security feature) in terms of average end-to-end delay, network throughput,
packet delivery ratio, and energy consumption.Sensors 2011, 11 4402
Keywords: wireless multimedia sensor networks; WMSN; WSN; routing protocol;
multimedia delivery; multipath; cluster-based routing; security
1. Introduction
In this section, we introduce brieﬂy two major issues of designing WMSNs, which are routing and
security in WMSNs, examine their main challenges, and present how our novel proposed solutions
address them.
1.1. Routing in WMSNs
Routing in Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs) is very challenging due to several
characteristics and constraints that distinguish them from contemporary communication and traditional
wireless sensor networks [1,2]. For example, classical IP-based routing protocols cannot be applied to
WMSNs to build a global addressing scheme for a network of large number of sensor nodes. Also, sensor
nodes are tightly constrained in terms of available energy, processing power, available bandwidth and
storage capacity and thus require careful resource management. Moreover, the multimedia nature of the
collected information in WMSN (video streaming, audio, and still images) adds more constraints on the
design of the routing protocols in order to meet the application-speciﬁc QoS requirements and network
conditions, and in consequence makes the proposed routing protocols for WSNs not directly applicable
for WMSNs. In addition, the use of densely deployed sensor nodes provides signiﬁcant redundancy in
the collected sensor data, e.g., overlapping of FoVs (Field of Views) of two camera sensors located in
the same cluster. In that case, the two cameras may collectively fuse their information to obtain a lower
bandwidth aggregated result, which is then routed (and possibly fused with other sensor node readings
along the way or within the cluster) to a cluster head or the sink. Therefore, such redundancy needs to
be exploited by the routing protocols to improve energy and bandwidth utilization and for more accurate
and robust observation results through effective data fusion and aggregation.
Handling multimedia content in WMSNs produces many trafﬁc classes and they can be categorized
into three main classes or services depending on their QoS requirements: (1) Event-driven service which
is delay intolerant and error intolerant but it requires less bandwidth, so a path with a little trafﬁc and
high signal to noise ratio is attractive for this kind of service. (2) Data query service is error intolerant but
query-speciﬁc delay tolerant applications, so a path with signiﬁcant congestion and a high signal to noise
ratio may be used for this service. (3) Stream query service which is delay intolerant but query-speciﬁc
error tolerant application (in a sense packet losses can be tolerated to a certain extent), so a path with
less trafﬁc and relatively lower signal to noise ratio is better for this type of service.
Due to the above mentioned challenges and differences, new routing protocols have been proposed
for WMSNs [1] that try to handle these new characteristics of WMSN and its design challenges by
either modifying the previous work done in WSNs (e.g., using multiple performance metrics to meet
the additional QoS requirements), or proposing new solutions based on new methodologies (e.g., usingSensors 2011, 11 4403
multi radio or MIMO systems, switching between multiple channels, selecting multi routing paths, or
mixing among these methods).
For WMSNs, cluster-based network architecture deployed with heterogeneous sensor nodes has more
advantages than a ﬂat network of homogeneous nodes. A single-tier ﬂat architecture can cause the sink
to overload with the increase in sensors density, which can affect the performance of the network and
cause latency in communication and tracking events. Also, in the homogeneous ﬂat network, all the
nodes should have the same hardware capabilities and functionalities for multimedia processing and
transmission, and this leads to increase the energy consumption and the cost of the deployed network.
Therefore in this paper, cluster-based with multi-path routing protocol has been pursued in our proposal
to allow the network to cover a large area of interest and cope with additional load without degrading
the quality of service. Our proposed routing protocol aims to cluster the nodes, so that cluster heads
can do some aggregation and reduction of data in order to save energy consumption and bandwidth
usage, and to ﬁnd the maximum number of paths suitable for the different requirements of handling
different trafﬁc classes. More speciﬁcally, the proposed routing protocol aims to satisfy the following
design goals: (1) supporting different trafﬁc classes of different delay and bandwidth requirements by
choosing the suitable path for each data type, (2) maintaining minimum end-to-end delay suitable for
real-time and non-real-time data packets to meet their playout deadlines, (3) achieving high throughput
and packet delivery ratio by selecting the paths with better link quality and avoiding collisions and
interferences, (4) saving energy at sensor nodes by moving the multimedia processing complexity as well
as the aggregation process to the cluster heads’ side, along with preventing path loops and path cycles
in establishing the routes, (5) providing load balancing and reliable data delivery by using multi-path
routing protocol and two-level QoS-aware scheduling, and (6) supporting a secure communication
among the nodes by implementing a light-weight distributed security scheme for key management as
explained in the following subsection.
1.2. Security in WMSNs
Many applications of WMSN have their additional and special requirements in terms of privacy and
security, such as military applications, medical care applications, and other video surveillance systems.
In addition to the fact that WMSNs are vulnerable to attacks more easily than the wired networks
because of their nature as a broadcast medium. In a broadcast medium, adversaries can easily eavesdrop
on, intercept, inject, and alter transmitted data [3]. In addition, adversaries are not restricted in using
sensor network hardware. They can interact with the network from a distance by using expensive
radio transceivers and powerful workstations. In general, there are many types of security attacks on
sensor networks such as: jamming, tampering, altered routing information, sinkhole, Sybil, wormholes,
acknowledgment spooﬁng, and hello-ﬂood attacks [4].
Attacks can be classiﬁed into outsider attacks and insider attacks [4]. Outsider attacks are where the
attacker has no special access to the sensor network, and the insider attacks are where an authorized
participant in the sensor network has gone badly. Insider attacks can be either compromised sensor
nodes running malicious code or external devices use stolen key material and data from legitimate nodes
to attack the network.Sensors 2011, 11 4404
The resource scarcity, ad hoc deployment, and immense scale of WMSNs make secure
communication a particularly challenging problem. Since the primary consideration for sensor networks
isenergyefﬁciency, securityschemesmustbalancetheirsecurityfeaturesagainstthecommunicationand
computational overhead required to implement them. Therefore, our focus for designing the security
scheme is to implement a lightweight security protocol in terms of energy efﬁciency and processing
complexity in order to secure the communication among the nodes so that every eligible receiver
should receive all messages intended for it and be able to verify the integrity of every message as
well as the identity of the sender. In this paper, we propose a lightweight distributed key management
protocol designed to ensure authentication, integrity and conﬁdentiality, without needing of a central
key distribution. Our security scheme is scalable because every node needs to generate a small number
of security keys even with deploying a large-scale network, it protects against the majority of outsider
attacks, and it resists against insider attacks since the stolen keys will affect only the local area (cannot
be used in other clusters). Advanced insider attacks can be eliminated by using simple intrusion
detection [5], which is outside the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: Section 2 introduces an overview of existing
related works. Section 3 provides network architecture and system model and assumptions. Section 4
describes the cluster-based multipath routing protocol in details. Section 5 presents the security scheme
for key management. Section 6 presents the performance evaluation. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper with summary and directions for future works.
2. Related Work
2.1. Routing in WMSNs
In this subsection, we brieﬂy survey the major and recent related works in multipath and cluster-based
routing protocols for WMSNs. In [6], an extensive survey has been conducted on the routing techniques
with QoS assurance, and also a classiﬁcation for the methodologies used for the proposed routing
protocols can be found in [1].
An energy and QoS-aware hierarchical routing protocol, PEMuR [7], is proposed to handle
multimedia data over WMSNs. PEMuR uses video packet scheduling algorithm based on an analytical
distortionpredictionmodeltoreducethevideotransmissionrate(droppinglesssigniﬁcantpackets)while
keeping minimum accepted distortion. The adopted routing protocol enables the selection of the energy
efﬁcient routing paths, manages the network load according to the energy residues of the nodes and
prevents useless data transmissions through the proposed use of an energy threshold. PEMuR assumes
that the network is deployed with homogeneous nodes where the number of cluster heads is predeﬁned
and they are elected by a powerful base station that can transmit to all network nodes.
A multipath routing protocol for WMSNs is presented in [8] called MPDT. This Multipath Data
Transfer protocol provides simultaneous multiple paths for communication between sources and
destination. The routing discovery process starts from the sources toward the sink using discovery
messages. MPDT aims to prolong the lifetime of the network by providing load balancing and to be
immune to some speciﬁc attacks by splitting the data into parts and encoding them using Reed Solomon
(RS) algorithm.Sensors 2011, 11 4405
Another multipath and QoS routing protocol is proposed for WMSNs in [9] called REAR. In this
protocol metadata is used instead of the real data to establish multi-path routing in order to reduce the
energy consumption and delay. Route establishment starts from the sources when they have data to be
sent by sending control messages to their neighbors containing the metadata. Intermediate nodes that
are interested in those metadata forward the control messages toward the sink. Found routes are then
optimized using modiﬁed version of Dijkstra algorithm to meet the QoS requirements for the real data.
Multimedia-aware Multipath Multi-Speed (Multimedia-aware MMSPEED) routing protocol is
proposed in [10]. Multimedia-aware MMSPEED is an extension over MMSPEED routing protocol
to take into account the embedded information in the received packets in which near optimum path
is reserved for I-packets and marginal paths are used for P-frames. MMSPEED protocol [11], which
is also an extension for SPEED protocol [12] that was designed for WSN, can differentiate between
ﬂows with different delay and reliability requirements and has signiﬁcant potential in video transmission
applications. However, experimental results in [10] show that MMSPEED is not compatible with some
special features of Multimedia trafﬁc such as high video frame rate and packets information dependency.
A non-interfering disjoint multipath routing for WMSN is proposed in [13]. It addressed the problem
of interference between multiple paths using one channel in WMSN and suggested an incremental
on-demand approach in which only one path is built for a given source and additional paths are built
when required in case of path congestion or lack of bandwidth. In order to solve the problem of
interference between close paths, the proposed solution forces the multipath routing to build paths that
are not interfering with each other from the beginning by putting all the interfering nodes of a given
path in a passive state. Passive nodes do not further participate in building any other path in future
and consequently will not interfere with previously built paths. The process starts at the sink when it
ﬂoods the network with requests until they reach the source nodes. The source node starts immediately
sending data on the selected paths and all the intermediate nodes between the source and the sink will
inform their neighbors to switch to the passive state. The proposed work argues that putting some
nodes in a passive or sleep mode increases the overall throughput and reduces the consumed amount of
energy in the network. Results obtained through simulation show that the proposed protocol achieves
better throughput with less energy consumption by using fewer non-interfering paths when compared to
multipath schemes without interference awareness.
Modiﬁcations on Directed Diffusion [14], the routing protocol for WSN, are done in [15], called
DHCT, to support multipath routing for WMSN based on link quality and latency metrics. One of
the modiﬁcations includes using Costp, which is a product of expected transmission count (ETX) and
delay, as a performance metric instead of pure delay that was used in Direct Diffusion. Since close
paths interfere with each other and consequently have poor SNRs which are indirectly used to estimate
ETX values, they have less probability to be selected by using Costp metric and this also will lead
to increase throughput. The other modiﬁcation is to reinforcing multiple links at the sink to obtain
disjoint path from the source, and to match multipath routing. However, this routing protocol does not
considerthebandwidthasQoSmetricforroutingdecisionorprioritizestheincomingpacketstoschedule
them but it does consider the playout deadline in a sense that the data arrives after the deadline will be
discarded. Results show that the presented protocol for multipath video streaming over WSNs obtains
higher throughput than its single path counterpart (EDGE [16]) through the use of multiple disjoint paths.Sensors 2011, 11 4406
A design of QoS aware routing protocol is presented in [17] to support high data rate for WMSNs
by ensuring bandwidth and end-to-end delay requirements of real time data and maximized throughput
of non-real time data. The routing protocol uses multiple paths, multiple channels, and QoS packet
scheduling technique based on the dynamic bandwidth adjustment and path-length-based proportional
delay differentiation (PPDD) techniques to meet the bandwidth and delay requirements respectively.
These requirements (bandwidth and delay) are adjusted locally at each node based on the path-length
and incoming trafﬁc in static ﬂat wireless network where all the nodes are homogeneous multimedia
sensornodescapableofperformingallpossibleapplicationtasks(video, audio, scalardata)andequipped
with single radio interface and multi-channels. QoS-aware packet scheduling policy considers different
priorities for real time packets and non-real time packets by using at each node a classiﬁer that checks
the type of the incoming packets and sends to appropriate queues, and a scheduler that schedules
the packets according to the delay and bandwidth requirements. The proposed protocol -as shown
through simulation- clearly improves average delay per real-time packet, average lifetime of a node,
and throughput of non-real-time data when compared with single-r and multi-r mechanisms.
A multi-constrained routing algorithm, MCRA, [18] is proposed for multimedia communications over
WMSN, which is based on query-ﬂooding and query-driven data delivery mode. The proposed algorithm
isdesignedtoprovideend-to-enddelayandpacketlossratiosuitableformultimediacontent, andbalance
the energy consumption. The routing process starts from the sink node that ﬂoods the network with
interest-messages. The source node that receives those interest messages and matches the needed query,
selects the path with minimum hop-count to send its data. Then the sink node when it receives the
data packet calculates the coordinates of the source node using the logical coordinates (hop-count). The
presented algorithm tries to reduce the amount of ﬂooding (interest messages) by either not forwarding
the interests to nodes receives them already or by merging multiple interests in one message.
2.2. Security in WMSNs
Several surveys [19–21] have been conducted for security protocols in WSN in general. They
discussed the existing security mechanisms and reviewed the proposed security protocols in
authentication and encryption, secure routing, key management and distribution, and intrusion detection
systems. Most of the Preexisting secure protocols -as shown in this subsection- have very strong
requirements, like having different shared keys between each of the nodes and the base station or
hardwaremodiﬁcation, whicharearguablytoostrongrequirementsforthoseproposalstobefeasible.The
following works discussed security implementations in WMSNs:
A security scheme is proposed in [22] for collaborative image transmission from image sensors
to cluster heads where heterogeneous cluster-based wireless image sensor network architecture is
assumed. The proposed scheme does not depend on a key-based security management, but it uses
an approach for secret image sharing on multiple node-disjoint paths for image delivery. In this
approach, the image is separated into overlapped and non-overlapped regions where the later is directly
transmitted without encryption after compression, while the former is conveyed via secret sharing and
transmitted with appropriate distribution ratio via multiple paths. The proposed scheme also exploits
the inter-image correlation among sensors sharing overlapped regions in order to achieve high-security
image transmission and to be more energy efﬁcient.Sensors 2011, 11 4407
In order to assure authentication and data integrity for multimedia data delivered over WMSN, an
energy-aware adaptive wavelet-based watermarking technique for real time image delivery is presented
in [23]. This technique embeds additional data called a watermark into some location in an image object
so it can be detected later to make an afﬁrmation about the object. The watermarking locations or
positions are adaptively chosen by using two thresholds to insert the watermark according to network
conditions so that the energy efﬁciency and security can be achieved. In order to degrade the effect of
the distortion of watermarked image, the proposed scheme embeds the watermark into few positions as
possible to make it invisible and allocates extra network resources to protect this embedded watermark
from high distortion so it can be detectable. In addition, it also embeds watermark coding redundancies
into the original image so the watermark becomes more robust to packet loss. The frequency-based
(middle band) discrete wavelet transform (DWT) has been selected because it is more robust, easy to
recognizable and authenticated at the receiver side, and it reduces computation complexity and process
delay by exploiting the correlation of the inter-frames.
In [24], a privacy paradigm called HoLiSTiC is proposed that secures routing and topology
information for WMSNs against outsider attacks. The paper assumes a clustered network with some
nodes equipped with free-space optical (FSO) capabilities. Also it assumes that the BS and CHs have
bidirectional communication links and the camera and transport nodes have unidirectional links. The
proposed protocol requires that each node to have an individual key shared with the BS and pairwise keys
shared between adjacent visual nodes in a cluster. In addition, every network entity has two pre-deployed
network-wide keys. All keys are employed for symmetric cryptography to provide a variety of security
services.
A secure data converter architecture is proposed in [25] for WMSN that employs ﬁngerprinting
and encryption capabilities for simultaneously digitize and authenticate sensor readings. The proposed
architecturesuggestedhardwaremodiﬁcationstothedataconverterandaimstoreducethecomputational
complexity of the security algorithms at the aggregation points in the systems that need in-network
processing. This can be done by embedding an authenticator payload into the data converter or the
modulator output in a way that it is not easily extractable without access to the secret key, and can be
used to verify the integrity of the sensor reading.
3. Network Architecture and System Model
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the network architecture model adopted by our proposed routing
protocol, the communication pattern among the nodes, and the assumptions made in implementing
both the routing and security algorithms. Our proposed network architecture’s model is following
the single-tier clustered architecture [1], as shown in Figure 1, deployed with heterogeneous sensor
nodes where camera, audio and scalar sensors within each cluster relay data to a cluster head. The
cluster head has more resources, more powerful, and it is able to perform intensive data processing.
The cluster head is wirelessly connected with the sink or the gateway either directly (in the case of
ﬁrst-level cluster head) or through other cluster heads in multi-hop fashion. The communication among
the sensor nodes both within a cluster and the communication between cluster-heads are managed by
our proposed cluster-based multi-path routing protocol to efﬁciently handle multimedia content over
the network and maintain the energy consumption of sensor nodes. Nodes within a particular clusterSensors 2011, 11 4408
communicate directly with their cluster head in a certain schedule and each cluster head is responsible
for performing data aggregation and fusion in order to decrease the amount of transferred data and the
number of transmitted messages to the sink. A cluster head is also responsible for selecting a suitable
path for each type of data, e.g., paths with good link quality or minimum delay are appropriate for
multimedia content, disjoint paths are suitable for multimedia streaming, and paths with less strict QoS
conditions can be used for scalar data.
Figure 1. Single-tier Clustered Architecture.
Our proposed routing protocol is based on hop count and received signal strength of the sensory
message as an indication on the link quality and distance between the nodes. The level of the received
power of a message in a large-scale wireless sensor network can be calculated using the propagation
model at physical layer:
Pr = PtGtGr (hrht)
2 d
 4L
 1 (1)
Where Pt and Pr are the power level of transmitted and received message respectively, Gt and Gr are
the transmitter and receiver antenna gain respectively, ht and hr are antenna height for the transmitter
and receiver respectively, d is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, and L is system loss
factor. Then, received signal strength (RSS) of a message can be equal to:
RSS = Pr=Pt ! RSS = GtGr (hrht)
2 d
 4L
 1 (2)
If we assume that antenna gain of the transmitter and receiver are equal to 1, antenna height of
the transmitter and receiver are equal to 1, and system loss factor also equals 1, then RSS can be
approximated as a function of distance between the transmitter and receiver as a dominating factor
affecting its value: RSS = 1/d4. For more accurate propagation model, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
and bit error rate (BER) should be taken into account [26] along with the received signal strength inSensors 2011, 11 4409
order to consider noises (from receiver and environment) and interferences from other packets arrived
simultaneously:
SNR = 10log
 
Pr
Np +
Pn 1
i=1 Pr
!
(3)
BER = 0:5  erfc
 s
Pr  BW
Np  R
!
(4)
Where BW is the channel bandwidth, Np is noise power, and R is data rate.
With respect to our security scheme, we assume that all nodes have unique IDs and the base station is
trusted node during all network operation time and thus it can keep the security keys in its memory. Also
we assume that the time required for establishing secure links (at the route discovery phase) is smaller
than the time needed by an adversary to compromise a node during node deployment.
4. Cluster-Based Multipath Routing in WMSN
This section describes the routing operation of our proposed cluster-based multi-path routing protocol
for WMSNs, called SCMR, which is based on the hierarchical structure of multiple paths established
depending on hop count and received signal strength (along with measured SNR & BER) as an indication
on the link quality and distance between the nodes. SCMR depends on the local information exchanged
among the nodes to establish the routes to the sink and does not require any coordination measurement
equipments or position message exchange.
4.1. Route Discovery
We focus here in demonstrating the mechanism of establishing our proposed routing protocol, and in
the next section we explain the process of securing the routing protocol. We are using two performance
metrics: hop-count (as indication for distance from the sink and delay), and received signal strength
(combined with SNR & BER) as indication for link quality (interference and noise level) and distance
from the sender. Two thresholds (upper, and lower) are used in SCMR to compare the signal strength
value of the received packets, where the upper threshold is used to determine the 1st-level cluster head
and group member nodes (as described below) and the lower threshold is used to establish the links
between cluster heads.
In the initializing phase of our proposed routing protocol, the base station starts sending periodic
broadcast messages, called BS-Msg, to the surrounding nodes. BS-Msg contains the identiﬁcation
number (ID) of the base station and the relevant security information to authenticate the communication
with other nodes. The nodes that receive BS-Msg messages compare the received signal strength index
(RSSI) with the upper threshold (Thr-High). If RSSI is greater than Thr-High, these nodes respond to
the base station by sending back acknowledgment messages informing their joining the base station as
their parent. Then, they start acting as 1st-level cluster heads as shown in an example in Figure 2 and
broadcast periodically control messages called CH-Msg to their neighboring nodes. CH-Msg contains
the ID of the cluster head, number of hops between the cluster head and the base station in the current
found path, IDs of the nodes joining this path up to the current cluster head, and the relevant securitySensors 2011, 11 4410
information. For each CH-Msg received by the surrounding nodes of the 1st-level cluster-heads, RSSI is
measured and compared with two thresholds, Thr-High and Thr-Low.
Figure 2. A Simple Example of Cluster-Based Multipath Network.
If the signal strength of the received CH-Msg is greater than Thr-High, the receiving node will start
behaving as a group member and sending back an acknowledgment message informing its joining to
the corresponding cluster head. Receiving a CH-Msg with RSSI greater than Thr-High indicates that
the sender (CH) is in near region, as seen from Equation 2, and the quality of the link is good and thus
this CH can better serve the communication toward the base station. In case a node receives more than
one message from different CHs with received signal strength larger than Thr-High, the node selects the
cluster head of the highest signal strength value.
The nodes that only receive messages with received signal strength between Thr-High and Thr-Low
will start acting as new cluster heads, in this case 2nd-level cluster heads, and respond back to the sender
informing their selection of him as one of their possible parents toward the base station. New cluster
heads may receive different CH-Msgs from previous-level cluster heads. In this case new cluster heads
consider these messages in order to construct multiple paths toward base station and sort these paths
based on certain criteria (such as link quality, end-to-end delay, bandwidth, or number of hops in the
path). Paths with good conditions, like high link quality, short end-to-end delay, enough bandwidth, or
less number of hops, are reserved for multimedia communication that requires certain level of quality of
service requirements. Other paths will be used for other types of data that does not require strict QoS
requirements such as scalar data. If the signal strength is less than Thr-Low, the message is considered as
lost or ignored. This process continues in the same manner to build the network until all nodes join theSensors 2011, 11 4411
network and determine their rules, i.e., cluster head or group member, and all possible paths are found.
The main routing process can be outlined in the following pseudo-code (as shown in Figure 3).
Figure 3. Pseudo-code of the Main Part of the Routing Protocol.
4.2. Route Optimization and Local Repair
In order to optimize the found routes in route discovery phase, path loops and path cycles should be
prevented. For path loops, each CH that receives CH-Msg from other nodes checks ﬁrst the IDs of the
nodes joining the path to know whether it already joined this path before or not as shown in Figure 4(a).
If a CH receives CH-Msg belongs to one of the paths already found before, it checks the conditions and
the status of the given path in order to update its routing information about this path and reﬂects these
changes (if any) on its decision of selecting the proper path for each type of data. Moreover, for path
optimization with minimum number of hops, a CH checks for every given path whether it is a child for
any participating node in this path (except of course its direct parent in this path). In this case, it is
better for the CH to communicate directly to that parent instead of making a path cycle as shown in an
example in Figure 4(b). Thus, if a path cycle is found, the cluster head deletes this path from its routing
information (as it is just a longer version of already found path) and keeps the shorter path.Sensors 2011, 11 4412
Figure 4. Examples of Path loop and Path Cycle.
(a) A Path Loop (b) A Path Cycle
In order to detect any node or link failure, an acknowledgment system has been used in the network.
Each source node or intermediate CH keeps track of sent data packets toward the sink. After receiving a
certain number of data packets, a CH sends an acknowledgment message (Ack-Msg) to the sender and
in the same manner waits an Ack-Msg from its parent conﬁrming receiving the data packets. If a node
did not receive an Ack-Msg from its parent (or its CH), it will assume that there is a node-failure or
link-failure and it will select another parent (path) -depending on its routing information tables - suitable
with the current type of data. Notice that in this process there is no need to initialize the entire network
to overcome the existing failure; it just affects the nodes along the failed path and because of that it is
called local repair. Then the source node starts sending its data again to the base station through the new
parent. Notice that in this case, the affected CH will reﬂect the changes on its next CH-Msgs in order for
all participating nodes in the old path to update their routing information according to the new state of
that path.
4.3. Two-Level QoS-Aware Scheduling
After establishing the network, all group members (sensor nodes) in each cluster are assigned to a
cluster head and each cluster head in the network knows now its parents toward the BS (for multiple
paths). Before data transmission, we introduce two-level QoS-aware scheduling: low-level scheduling
within the cluster among the group members, and scheduling among the cluster heads at higher level in
order to increase the packet delivery ratio and throughput for multimedia data. The two-level scheduling
is shown in a simple example in Figure 5. We prefer to adopt TDMA protocol to access the channel as
it has a natural advantage of collision-free medium access, and it is more appropriate for transmitting
multimedia applications with QoS at reliable channel conditions and heavier trafﬁc load. In order to
avoid channel under-utilization and to decrease the delay, dynamic time-slot is assigned to the nodes
depending on the amount of data to be transmitted and the time for sending Ack-Msgs if needed.
At low level, before GMs start sending their different types of data to their CHs, each CH should
schedule the data transmissions among its GMs within the cluster in order to give higher priority to
the nodes that demand higher or strict QoS requirements for their data, and to avoid collisions and
interferences at receiver side. The low-level scheduling process is initiated by the CH by sending a
broadcast message asking each GM in the cluster to send a request message (Req-Msg) informing aboutSensors 2011, 11 4413
the type of data to be transmitted, its amount, and its requirements (such as playout deadline, BW...
etc.). This broadcast message, Assign-Msg, contains the control slot assignment, based on TDMA
(i.e., time slot to each node), to each GM in the cluster to send its Req-Msg. The duration of the time
slot is enough to any node in the cluster to send its Req-Msg and the time slot is unique for each node
to avoid collisions. During the request phase, each GM sends a Req-Msg to its CH at the allocated time
slot informing about the data to be sent (if available) and its QoS requirements.
Figure 5. A Simple Example of Two-level Scheduling.
Then based on the collected information from the request phase, each CH generates a transmission
schedule for the active GMs and distributes it in the cluster. The resulting schedule is sent to all GMs
by broadcasting a scheduling message, called Sched-Msg, to inform each GM with the speciﬁed time
schedule for sending each type of data. The duration of the time-slot depends on the amount and type of
data to be transmitted as requested by each GM. By this way, multimedia streaming and time-critical data
can be transmitted ﬁrst, then less priority data such as still images and then scalar data can be sent later.
Moreover, for better energy efﬁciency, GMs can turn off their radio transceiver when the schedule has
been received until the time slot for transmission a certain data type approaches or to the end of the data
transmission phase if they are passive nodes. After receiving the schedule, each GM will transmit its data
during the assigned time slots for each data type and the CH sends, after receiving a certain number of
data packets, an Ack-Msg to the sender as described before. When the data transmission phase complete,
a CH sends again the Assign-Msg to its GMs to send their requests. A cluster time-intervals is in Figure 6
illustrating the scheduling operation.Sensors 2011, 11 4414
Figure 6. A Cluster Time Intervals for Scheduling Process.
At higher level, each intermediate cluster head—in the same manner done at low level—schedules the
trafﬁc toward the sink from other cluster heads (its children) based on the type of the data and its QoS
requirements. Forexample, asshowninFigure5, CH1selectsthepaththroughCH4tosenditsstreaming
multimedia data and the path through CH3 to send the other types of data based on the proposed routing
algorithm, while CH2 sends all its data to CH3. CH3 and CH4 then need to schedule the transmission
from children CHs following the same steps done at low level inside the cluster.
5. Light-Weight Distributed Security Scheme
In this section, we explain in details the implementation of our proposed lightweight distributed
security scheme of key management: Our security protocol provides privacy and integrity against
external attacks. It also limits the effect of insider attacks i.e., nodes that have been compromised
and controlled by an attacker who now possesses all valid keys) since the generated keys are unique
and cannot be used in different areas of the network. In addition, our security scheme allows for
aggregation processing since cluster heads can decrypt the sent data if necessary and update the
corresponding information. This is achieved with the shared keys between the nodes in the cluster.
Moreover, our proposed security algorithm supports both authenticated encryption and authentication
onlyservices: withauthenticatedencryption, thedatapayloadisencryptedusinganencryptionalgorithm
such as MISTY1 or Skipjack algorithm [27] and the entire packet is authenticated with a message
authentication code (MAC) using for example Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
based on cryptographic hash function or message digest (SHA1 [28]). The MAC is computed over
the encrypted data and the packet header. The decryption operation is done only at the sink and at
cluster heads during aggregation process (if needed). In authentication only service where the data is not
sensitive, our security scheme authenticates the entire packet with a MAC tag, but the data payload is
not encrypted. The notations shown in Table 1 are used for establishing formulas of the needed security
keys, as described in the following subsections:Sensors 2011, 11 4415
Table 1. Security Notations used in Security Formulas.
5.1. Key Management
Our security scheme uses symmetric keys to encrypt and authenticate messages. Therefore, sensor
nodes will only receive messages from other nodes that share the same security keys. The key
management is composed of two phases: a key generation phase and a key distribution phase. In the key
generation phase, a Master key (Km) is installed in the sensor motes when they are programmed with
the intended software. The key distribution phase provides a means for distributing or synchronization
of the security keys (unique-node key, pair-wise key, and unique-cluster key) among the nodes. The key
management protocol satisﬁes the following security properties of a key establishment:
 The shared security keys between a node and the neighboring nodes and/or BS cannot be used to
recover the master key. This is guaranteed because of the one-wayness of a secure hash function.
 The master key (Km) is kept by the nodes as long as it is necessary to establish security keys with
their neighbors, and then it is deleted from their memory. The base station holds Km along with
the unique-node keys of each sensor node in the network.
(1) The unique-node key (Ki) is the shared key between every node (i) in the network and the trusted
base station and used to verify node identities and exchange data securely. The derivation of this key for
each node is as follows:
Ki = F(Km;Si) (5)
where F( ) is a secure hash function, Km is the master key and Si is the unique identiﬁer (number) for
the i-th sensor node.
(2) The pair-wise key (Kij) is the shared key between two neighboring nodes i and j, such as each
GM and its CH in a cluster and every CH and its parent in the network, and it is computed as follows:
Kij = F(Km;Si;Sj) where Si < Sj (6)
Notice that since both nodes have the master key, they both can compute the pair-wise key. This key
now can be used to send information from Si to Sj (and vice versa) in a secure and authenticated manner.
Also this key is needed especially for aggregation process and data fusion at the CH. In order to support
aggregation process, CHs need to be able to look at data sent by their GMs and perform some function
on the data if necessary.Sensors 2011, 11 4416
(3) The unique-cluster key (Kch) is the shared key within a cluster in the network and it is different
from other cluster-keys of other clusters. This key is used for command dissemination and broadcasting
messages and it is generated as follows:
Kch = F(Km;Si;Si) (7)
where Si is the unique identiﬁer number for the cluster head. Once the unique-cluster key is settled,
node i can broadcast commands/messages to all the nodes in the cluster encrypted and authenticated
using Kch.
5.2. Implementation of the Security Scheme
In this subsection, we will focus on the security scheme and authenticating the participating nodes
while establishing the paths in the clustered WMSN network. As we mentioned before, all the nodes in
the network have the preloaded master key (Km), then each one of them compute the unique-node key
shared between the node and BS. Before BS starts broadcasting its BS-Msgs, it ﬁrst authenticates itself
by properly calculating the MAC tag of these messages using the master key (Km) and including this
MAC in one of the ﬁelds of BS-Msg, as follows:
BS ! Sj : BS   Msg;MACKm(BS   Msg) (8)
Upon receiving this message, the node Sj checks the MAC using the same master key before
processing the other data to extract the routing information. If the MAC is veriﬁed, BS will be added in
the routing table of node Sj along with all relevant security information such as nonce identiﬁer (random
number used once composed of random number and time stamp) and sequence number used to avoid
replay attacks, and pair-wise key will be generated. On the other hand, when the veriﬁcation process is
valid, thesenodesreplytoBSbysendingbackAck-MsgsauthenticatedwithMACusingtheunique-node
key to avoid impersonation attempts and to authenticate themselves to the BS as 1st-level cluster heads.
In the same manner, cluster heads include in their CH-Msgs the MAC tag using the master key and other
relevant security information in order to authenticate the communication between them and other cluster
heads and their group members and to exchange data securely:
CH ! BS : Ack   Msg;MACKi(Ack   Msg) (9)
CH ! Sj : CH   Msg;MACKm(CH   Msg) (10)
At the same way, each node Sj behaves as a group member in any cluster of the network sends back
an Ack-Msg to its CH which is also properly authenticated by including the MAC tag using the pair-wise
key.
Sj ! CH : Ack   Msg;MACKij(Ack   Msg) (11)
After the network is built up and each node knows its parent (if it is a cluster head) and its cluster
head (if it is a group member), all the cluster heads and the group members compute the unique-cluster
key of their clusters. This key will be used later on for authenticating any cluster head messages forSensors 2011, 11 4417
broadcasting messages or disseminating commands within the cluster. Finally, the master key should be
deleted from the memory of all nodes since the security of our protocol depends on the deletion of the
master key at the end of the process. We should take care that the deletion is unrecoverable, for example
by overwriting the master key (in practice several times). Now, the communication between the nodes
and the base station has been secured and the sources can send their data securely:
Sj ! CH : Data   Msg;MACKij(HeaderjEKij(Data)) (12)
5.3. Node Addition
Notice that after deletion of the master key from the network, we will encounter a problem for
node addition, node movement, or when a path condition changes during a local repair or rediscovery
process. In all these cases, we cannot establish a new connection between two nodes that they did not
communicate before without having the appropriate shared security keys between them. And in order to
generate these keys, the nodes should know the master key that is already deleted from their memory.
One solution to this problem is to assume that the base station is secure and trusted at any time during
the network operation, so that there is no need to delete the master key from its memory. In the case of
node addition, a new node has the master key but the existing nodes do not have. So, the new node ﬁrst
generatesthe unique-nodekey fromthe masterkey andwaitsuntil ithears broadcastmessages (CH-Msg)
from other CHs, then it selects one of them, or more depending on the proposed routing protocol, as its
CH or parent toward BS. The new node then sends a request message authenticated with the MAC tag
using the unique-node key to the selected CH asking the base station for the appropriate keys (pair-wise
and unique-cluster keys) for the new connections. The selected CH forwards the request message as it
is (without verifying the MAC) toward BS. Then, BS veriﬁes the MAC of this message, generates the
requested security keys using the master key, and sends them back to the requesting node and its CH or
parent. The new node then establishes the new connections and deletes the master key from its memory.
For node movement or when the path conditions have changed, the same process of adding new
nodes will be followed except that these nodes do not have the master key as well but they have already
generated the unique-node keys.
6. Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the secure cluster-based routing protocol, several simulation
experiments (over 100) with various random topologies were run. We implemented our proposed
protocol using NS-2 version 2.34. NS-2 [29] is an open source, discrete event simulator which is widely
used for research purposes. It has an excellent implementation of the 802.11 standards at physical, Data
link and higher layers. We simulate the proposed routing protocol assuming a multi-hop network of size
500 m  500 m deployed with different number of sensor nodes ranging from 50 to 200 in randomized
grid. The sink is located in the center of the network. The trafﬁc is CBR of 600 packets/sec and the
packet size is 316 bytes. Table 2 shows our simulation environment and other parameters used in our
simulation.Sensors 2011, 11 4418
Table 2. Simulation Parameters.
6.1. Routing Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we compare our performance evaluation results (average) with DHCT [15],
MCRA [18], and EDGE [16] protocols. We consider in this comparison four important performance
metrics: throughput, end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio, and power consumption:
End-to-end delay is one of the important QoS parameter that we consider in designing our proposed
routing protocol to handle the real-time trafﬁc and deliver the packets within their playout deadlines.
End-to-end delay is the time difference from the time a source node sends its data packet to the time the
sink receives it, and it can be measured as sum of (transmission delay, propagation delay, queuing delay,
and processing delay at each hop). We obtain an average end-to-end delay of 75 ms which satisﬁes the
end-to-end delay requirements of real-time multimedia packets. Figure 7 shows a comparison between
our proposed protocol, SCMR, with the other protocols (DHCT, MCRA, and EDGE) in terms of average
end-to-end delay with different node number. It can be seen clearly that our protocol outperform other
protocols due to the hierarchical architecture of powerful cluster heads that always select the route with
lowest number of hops of better link quality and hence minimum delay.
Figure 7. End-to-End Delay of Our Protocol Compared with Other Protocols.Sensors 2011, 11 4419
In Figure 8, the mean throughput of our protocol is shown compared with the other protocols. The
throughput is measured as the total number of packet received at the sink over the simulation period.
Selecting multiple paths of better link quality and minimum delay leads to load balancing and efﬁcient
utilization of the wireless spectrum, and hence achieves higher throughput and much better performance
than other protocols as seen in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Throughput of Our Protocol Compared with Other Protocols.
Figure 9 shows the average packet delivery ratio (PDR) of our protocol with different node number.
PDR is measured as the total number of data packets received at the sink over the total number of data
packets sent by all sources in the network. It is shown that our proposed protocol outperforms the other
protocols, which conﬁrms the previous result, due to the use of the 2nd-level scheduling that prevents
collisions and minimizes interference along with the selection of paths with better link quality based on
the received signal strength (along with SNR and BER). Also, the use of the fast mechanism of local
repair through the acknowledgment system minimizes the effects of any node failure or link break and
hence decreases the number of lost packets.
Figure 9. PDR of Our Protocol Compared with Other Protocols.Sensors 2011, 11 4420
Average energy consumption is shown in Figure 10 where we can realize that our proposed protocol
SCMR has less energy dissipation comparing with other protocols (DHCT, MCRA, and EDGE) with
different node numbers. This result due to the fact that most of the nodes in the clustered network are
GMs and need only to communicate with their CHs regardless of the number of nodes in the cluster.
In addition, the 2nd-level scheduling prevents packet collisions and interferences and hence there is no
need for retransmission lost packets. Also, the paths found by SCMR are optimized in terms of number
of hops since the routing algorithm depends on the hop-count as one of its metrics along with preventing
path loops and path cycles, which lead to minimum number of packet forwarding from a source to the
sink. Moreover, the aggregation process and data fusion done at CHs reduce the size of correlated data
within a cluster and thus decrease the needed amount of energy to deliver them.
Figure 10. Energy Consumption of Our Protocol Compared with Other Protocols.
6.2. Security Performance Analysis
In this subsection we examine the security protection achieved by our proposed security scheme
against some general security threats in sensor networks, and its performance in terms of memory
requirement and scalability:
Defenses from outsider attacks: Most of the outsider attacks against WMSN routing protocols
can be prevented by providing conﬁdentiality (through encryption and authentication) using the shared
security keys. Even a simple scheme uses only the shared master key will prevent unauthorized nodes
from joining the topology of the network and hence attacks like selective forwarding, acknowledgment
spooﬁng, wormhole, and sinkhole attacks are disallowed. Hello-ﬂood attacks are detected since
broadcasting messages in the network done only by using the master key and unique-cluster key. Also
by using the unique-node and pair-wise keys, attacks such as Sybil attack is prevented because a single
node cannot present multiple identities without having the security keys. The network is also protected
againstreplayattacksasallmessagesexchangedinthenetworkaretrackedbyatimestampandsequence
number. Notice that a GM needs only to maintain a one counter for its CH, and a CH needs to keep
counters only for its GMs and parents.Sensors 2011, 11 4421
Defenses from insider attacks: Security mechanisms using only the master key cannot protect
the network against insider attacks or compromised nodes. Insider attacks can disrupt the network by
spooﬁng or altering routing information, selective forwarding, and broadcasting Hello-ﬂoods. Therefore,
our proposed security scheme can protect the network against insider attacks by verifying both node
identities and bidirectional link, as well as authenticating broadcast messages. Identities can be veriﬁed
by sharing a symmetric unique-node key for every node with a trusted base station. Two neighboring
nodescanauthenticatethebidirectionallinkbetweenthembyusingthemasterkeytoverifyotheridentity
and establish a shared pair-wise key for securing the communication between them. Broadcasting can be
authenticated by using a unique-cluster key derived from the master key and shared, for example, within
a cluster or group of nodes. Using those unique symmetric keys, our security scheme resists against
insider attacks and minimizes their effects as a compromised node disturbs only a local part and the rest
of the network remains secured.
Scalability: Our securityscheme scales well asit requires only localinformation for key management
without needing of central distribution. Furthermore, the number of security keys needed to be stored at
each node does not depend on the network size but only on node density (i.e., average number of group
members within a cluster and number of neighboring cluster heads). Average number of GMs or the size
of cluster can be determined by adjusting the value of Thr-High. Also it is shown in Figure 11 that the
density of cluster heads in the network is decreasing with the network size and tends to be ﬁxed at large
network size.
Figure 11. Density of Cluster Heads vs Network Size.
Memory requirements: The majority of nodes (i.e., GMs) need only to store three keys:
unique-node, pair-wise, and unique-cluster keys. On the other hand, each CH needs to store the pair-wise
keys it shares with its group members and parents, in addition to the unique-node and unique-cluster
keys. Recall the powerful capabilities of CHs, storing N keys (N = Ki + Kch + (n + m)  Kij where
n is number of parents and m is cluster size), with an average number of parents is 6 (i.e., six different
paths) and an average cluster size of 10, does not need considerable memory space.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a Secure Cluster-based Multipath Routing protocol (SCMR) for WMSNs
designed to handle the additional requirements of reliable data delivering of different trafﬁc classes andSensors 2011, 11 4422
provide load balancing by using multipath routing. The proposed routing protocol, SCMR, is based
on the hierarchical structure of multiple paths established depending on the hop count and received
signal strength as an indication on the link quality, delay, and distance between the nodes. SCMR
maintains minimum end-to-end delay suitable for real-time and non-real-time data packets to meet their
playout deadline, and achieves high throughput and packet delivery ratio by selecting the paths with
better link quality and avoiding collisions and interferences. SCMR reduces energy consumption at
sensor nodes by moving the multimedia processing complexity as well as the aggregation process to the
cluster heads’ side along with preventing path loops and path cycles in establishing the routes. Also we
presented a light-weight distributed security implementation of key management for supporting a secure
communication among the nodes. Performance evaluation results show that SCMR clearly outperforms
thepreexistingones(DHCT,MCRA,EDGE)inallaverageend-to-enddelay, throughput, packetdelivery
ratio and battery power consumption. In future work, we will consider a cross layer design optimization
especially between the routing and MAC layers to maximize the overall network performance with
minimum energy consumption, reliable delivery, and efﬁcient resource management. Also with respect
to the security scheme, we will develop a light-weight intrusion detection system to eliminate the threats
from insider attacks.
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